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I. INTRODUCTION 
What if a husband tells his wife that he molested the neighbors’ 
three-year-old child at the neighborhood public park?  And what if the 
wife is willing to testify about her husband’s confession in a criminal 
trial, but the husband claims that his confession is privileged?  Should 
the wife be allowed to testify?  The answer in more than half of the states 
and in federal court is no.1 
What if a husband tells his wife that he molested her ten-year-old, 
mentally handicapped sister while she was visiting for the weekend?  
Should the wife be allowed to testify about this confession in a criminal 
trial?  The answer in many states and in federal court is no.2 
What if a husband tells his wife that he molested their one-year-old 
grandson while babysitting him?  Should the wife be allowed to testify 
about this confession?  The answer in many states and federal court is  
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 1. Set forth in the Appendix to this Article infra Part VI, Table 2 summarizes the exceptions to 
the confidential-marital-communications privilege in cases where a spouse confesses to the other 
spouse that an act of child molestation was committed against a child.  See also infra Part III. 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 339 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (explaining that the 
exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege did not extend to defendant’s 
confession to his wife of molesting her minor, mentally handicapped sister); see also Appendix infra 
Part VI. 
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no.3  What if the grandmother divorces the grandfather, should she now 
be allowed to testify?  The answer is still no.4 
If any of these hypotheticals are slightly changed so that the husband 
confessed to his wife that he molested their own child (as opposed to a 
neighbor’s child, a sister-in-law, or grandchild), then the answer 
changes—the wife would be allowed to testify about the husband’s 
confession.5  These inconsistent laws are not just. 
The confidential-marital-communications privilege is designed to 
keep conversations between spouses private to preserve marital 
harmony.6  There are exceptions to this privilege.  The law in all 
jurisdictions would allow a spouse to testify about confidential 
communications involving a crime against the child of either spouse.7  
The child-of-either-spouse exception, however, is too narrow, especially 
in child-molestation cases. 
The purpose of this Article is to show that jurisdictions should 
expand the child-of-either-spouse exception so that defendants cannot 
invoke the confidential-marital-communications privilege in child-
molestation cases involving crimes against “any child.”  If the exception 
is broadened to the any-child standard, then in all of the hypotheticals set 
forth above, the husband could not claim that his confession to his wife is 
protected by the confidential-marital-communications privilege.  Part II 
of this Article explores the history and the general requirements of the 
marital privileges.  Part III analyzes the laws in all fifty states and the 
federal jurisdictions to determine what exception is being applied in 
child-molestation cases; an Appendix to this Article, included in Part VI, 
groups the exceptions into three categories.  Part IV of this Article sets 
forth the reasons why federal courts and state legislatures should adopt 
the any-child exception and the legal analysis, including proposed 
legislation, of how they can do so. 
                                                     
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974–77 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the 
exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege did not extend to the defendant’s 
confession to his wife of making a pornographic video of his grandson); see also Appendix infra 
Part VI. 
 4. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (stating that divorce does not 
terminate privilege for confidential marital communications made during a valid marriage). 
 5. See Appendix infra Part VI. 
 6. United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the 
confidential-marital-communications privilege fosters marital harmony). 
 7. See Appendix infra Part VI. 
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II. REQUIREMENTS AND HISTORY OF THE MARITAL PRIVILEGES 
A. General Requirements of the Marital Privileges 
The marital privileges encompass two separate privileges: (1) the 
adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and (2) the confidential-marital-
communications privilege.8  These two privileges interrelate and provide 
two levels of protection for communications between spouses.  The 
adverse-spousal-testimony privilege governs the competency of a 
witness, which determines whether a spouse is allowed to testify against 
his or her spouse.9  Generally, the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege 
prevents a witness-spouse from testifying adversely at trial against the 
defendant-spouse unless the witness-spouse chooses to testify; thus, the 
witness-spouse holds this privilege.10 
The confidential-marital-communications privilege is broader in 
scope than the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and protects all 
communications made by a spouse to a spouse during a valid marriage, 
regardless of the current marital status.11  Unlike the adverse-spousal-
testimony privilege, the witness does not hold the marital-
communications privilege and, therefore, the nontestifying spouse can 
invoke the privilege even if the witness-spouse wants to testify about the 
communications.12  Also, unlike the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege, 
the marital-communications privilege survives dissolution of a marriage; 
thus, a defendant can invoke the privilege even if he or she is divorced 
from the witness.13  Some scholars have likened the marital-
communications privilege to a broader version of the attorney-client 
privilege (or doctor-patient privilege).14  The marital-communications 
privilege is considered broader because it may be invoked by either 
spouse regardless of who made the communication, unlike the attorney-
client privilege, which belongs to the client and can only be waived by 
the client.15  Table 1 summarizes the general requirements of each 
privilege. 
                                                     
 8. David Farnham, The Marital Privilege, LITIGATION, Winter 1992, at 34, 34. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  The marriage must be considered valid.  United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 729 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
 12. Farnham, supra note 8, at 34. 
 13. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 729; United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 14. Farnham, supra note 8, at 36. 
 15. Id. 
1GOODNO FINAL 11/5/2010  7:53:41 AM 
4 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 









“‘The testimonial privilege 
looks forward with reference 
to the particular marriage at 
hand: the privilege is meant to 
protect against the impact of 
the testimony on the 
marriage.’”17 
“The marital communications 
privilege[,] in a sense, is broader 
and more abstract [than the 
adverse-spousal-testimony 
privilege]: it exists to insure that 
spouses . . . feel free to 
communicate their deepest feelings 
to each other without fear of 
eventual exposure in a court of 
law.”18 
Scope The scope includes testimony 
from a spouse against a spouse 
on all matters in a criminal 
proceeding,19 including those 
that occurred before and 
during the marriage.20 
The scope includes testimony in a 
criminal or civil proceeding 
concerning confidential21 
communications22 made between 
spouses.23 
                                                     
 16. While the underlying policy of both marital privileges is to preserve the marriage, there are 
some differences between the purposes of the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and the 
confidential-marital-communications privilege.  See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 
1018–19 (6th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the “rationale” for the confidential-marital-communications 
privilege “differs somewhat from that of the adverse testimony privilege”). 
 17. United States v. Westmoreland, 312 F.3d 302, 307 n.3 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United 
States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Porter, 986 F.2d at 1018 (quoting 
United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 18. Porter, 986 F.2d at 1018 (quoting Byrd, 750 F.2d at 590); see Westmoreland, 312 F.3d at 
307 n.3 (quoting Lofton, 957 F.2d at 477); see also United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (“[The confidential marital] privilege exists ‘to protect the integrity of marriages and 
ensure that spouses freely communicate with one another.’” (quoting United States v. Griffin, 440 
F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006))). 
 19. The role of marital privileges in civil litigation remains unclear and is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  See, e.g., In re Martenson, 779 F.2d 461, 463 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing the issue 
of whether the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege is allowed in civil litigation). 
 20. United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 570–71 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that adverse-
spousal-testimony privilege would apply to matters occurring prior to marriage but denying the use 
of the privilege because the marriage in the case was fraudulent).  But see United States v. Clark, 
712 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that adverse-spousal-testimony privilege does not apply 
to acts before marriage). 
 21. Courts have held that any communications made in the absence of a third party are 
presumed confidential.  Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); see also Blau v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951). 
 22. This privilege applies to conduct and expressions “intended” as a communication.  Pereira, 
347 U.S. at 6; United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1443 (10th Cir. 1997).  “Though this privilege 
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Holder of the 
Privilege 
The testifying spouse alone 
has the privilege to refuse to 
testify and may not be forced 
to testify or prevented from 
testifying.24  
Either spouse may assert the 
privilege;25 thus, even if one spouse 
is willing to testify, the other may 
object and thereby bar the 
testimony.26 
Timing To claim the privilege, the 
defendant and the testifying 
spouse must have a valid 
marriage at the time the 
witness is called to testify.27 
The privilege attaches at the time 
the confidential communication was 




No, the privilege terminates 
with the termination of the 
marriage.29 
Yes, confidential communications 
made during a valid marriage 
survive termination of the 
marriage.30 
 
Although the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and confidential-
marriage-communications privilege allow for different levels of 
protection, they have the same historic roots.31  To understand the current 
law and underlying theory of the marital-communications privilege and 
exceptions to it, one must appreciate how the current legal landscape 
developed. 
                                                                                                                       
has been expanded to encompass more than mere conversations and writings, invocation of the 
privilege requires the presence of at least a gesture that is communicative or intended by one spouse 
to convey a message to the other.”  United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 795 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 23. GLEN WESSINBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 249–50 (2007). 
 24. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). 
 25. See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934); United States v. Montgomery, 384 F.3d 
1050, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 26. See United States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399, 401–02 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 27. See United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975). 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that 
communications made after marriage are excluded from the confidential-communications privilege). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the 
adverse-spousal-testimony privilege may not be asserted once the marriage ends). 
 30. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); see also United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 
432, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that the confidential-marriage-communications privilege survives 
a spouse’s death). 
 31. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44–45 (1980). 
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B. Legal History of the Marital Privileges 
1. Legal History of the Adverse-Spousal-Testimony Privilege 
The United States Supreme Court32 and many commentaries33 have 
concluded that the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege originated from 
the common law rule of “spousal disqualification,” which provided that a 
wife was incompetent to testify against or for her husband.34  The 
spousal-disqualification rule has medieval roots.35  Lord Coke observed 
in 1628 that “it hath beene resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be 
produced either against or for her husband.”36 
Spousal disqualification is based on two tenets of jurisprudence.  
First, parties were historically incompetent to testify on their own behalf 
based on the theory that their interest in the proceeding made it probable 
that their testimony would be unreliable.37  Second, a husband and wife 
were considered “one person,” and, thus, could not testify against each 
other; however, since wives were not historically recognized as having a 
separate legal existence from their husbands, for purposes of this theory, 
the husband constituted the “one person,” which meant that the wife 
could not testify against the husband.38  From these two doctrines, the 
                                                     
 32. Id.; Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958). 
 33. David Medine, The Adverse Testimony Privilege: Time to Dispose of a “Sentimental Relic”, 
67 OR. L. REV. 519, 522–23 (1988); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of 
Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 2054 (1995); Developments in the Law—Privileged 
Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1564 (1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. 
 34. 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 66, 78. (6th ed. 2006).  Some 
commentators have concluded that the testimonial privilege preceded the spousal disqualification 
rule.  See Recent Decisions, 35 MICH. L. REV. 320, 329, 329 n.5 (1936) (explaining that while the 
rule of spousal disqualification prohibited a witness-spouse from testifying favorably for the 
defendant-spouse, the testimony privilege prevented the witness-spouse from testifying adversely: 
“The reason a spouse could not testify against the other was that family dissension and discord 
would be occasioned”).  The wife was prevented from testifying because of the privilege and not 
because she was considered incompetent or disqualified.  Medine, supra note 33, at 523; see also 
Richard O. Lempert, A Right to Every Woman’s Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 725, 726–27 (1981); 
The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 NW. U. L. REV. 208, 209–10 
(1961).  See generally 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5572 (1989) (describing the policy behind spousal privileges). 
 35. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 43. 
 36. Id. at 43–44 (quoting 1 E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628)); see also 
Michael W. Mullane, Trammel v. United States: Bad History, Bad Policy, and Bad Law, 47 ME. L. 
REV. 105, 128 (1995) (noting that Lord Coke’s Commenterie upon Littleton was the first known 
reference to the spousal disqualification rule). 
 37. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Mullane, supra note 36, at 122. 
 38. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.  See generally 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 34, § 78 (discussing 
the history and background of the privilege for marital communication). 
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rule of spousal disqualification emerged: “[W]hat was inadmissible from 
the lips of the defendant-husband was also inadmissible from his wife.”39  
The justification for the spousal disqualification rule was “an argument 
from public policy, namely, that to allow one spouse to testify against 
another might cause ‘implacable discord and dissension’ and so threaten 
a marriage.”40 
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the rule of spousal 
disqualification in the 1839 case of Stein v. Bowman.41  In Stein, the 
Court applied the well-established rule that “[a wife] cannot testify for or 
against [her husband] in a suit in which he is a party, or interested.”42  
The spousal-disqualification rule, however, began to lose force when 
Congress passed an act in 1878 making a defendant competent as a 
witness in any criminal case.43  The reasoning was that if a defendant 
was competent to testify on his own behalf, then it was hard to argue that 
a defendant’s wife was incompetent to do so.  The spousal-
disqualification rule was finally abolished in 1933, when the Supreme 
Court in Funk v. United States44 reasoned that “nor can the exclusion of 
the wife’s testimony, in the face of the broad and liberal extension of the 
rules in respect of the competency of witnesses generally, be any longer 
justified, if it ever was justified, on any ground of public policy.”45  
Though the witness-spouse was now competent to testify on behalf of the 
defendant-spouse, the Court “left undisturbed the rule that either spouse 
could prevent the other from giving adverse testimony.  The rule thus 
evolved into one of privilege rather than one of absolute 
                                                     
 39. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Recent Decisions, supra note 34, at 329 (noting that the rule of 
spousal disqualification dealt mainly with the witness-spouse testifying favorably for the defendant-
spouse: “Against favorable testimony was a fear that the interest of the witness-spouse would cause 
discoloration of testimony, bias, and offer a temptation to perjure, creating an incompetency which 
waiver by neither spouse could remove”). 
 40. Lempert, supra note 34, at 728 (quoting COKE, supra note 36).  Dean Wigmore presents a 
different argument, explaining that the privilege originated not from the spousal disqualification rule, 
but from the doctrine of petit treason: “At that time, a wife or servant who harmed the head of 
household could be tried for petit treason.  Consequently . . . to permit a wife or servant to commit 
petit treason indirectly by causing the husband’s death through their testimony would have been 
irrational.”  Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1564–65. 
 41. 38 U.S. 209, 222–23 (1839). 
 42. Id. at 215. 
 43. Act of Mar. 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2006)). 
 44. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 387 (1933) (overruling Hendrix v. United States, 219 
U.S. 79, 91 (1911) (holding a wife was not a competent witness and should be excluded from 
testifying based on her interest in the proceeding); Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 
(1920) (holding that a wife could not testify against her husband and noting the point “hardly 
require[s] mentioning”)). 
 45. Id. at 381. 
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disqualification.”46  The Court reasoned that adverse testimony by a 
spouse might destroy a marriage, so in the 1958 case, Hawkins v. United 
States,47 the Court finally held that both spouses held the privilege to bar 
adverse testimony.48 
Although the spousal-disqualification rule evolved into the adverse-
spousal-testimony privilege, the trend in state law was to reject it because 
it was the nontestifying spouse that was able to exercise the privilege to 
prevent testimony.49  In 1980, the Court tackled the privilege once again 
in Trammel v. United States.50  After reciting the torrid history of the 
privilege,51 the Court held that “‘reason and experience’ no longer justify 
so sweeping a rule . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the existing rule 
should be modified so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to 
refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to 
testify nor foreclosed from testifying.”52  Thus, since Trammel, the 
spousal-testimony privilege belongs to the spouse who is testifying, and 
that spouse can decide whether to exercise that privilege.53 
2. Legal History of the Confidential-Marital-Communications Privilege 
While the marital-communications privilege arose 
contemporaneously with the spousal-disqualification rule54 that spouses 
                                                     
 46. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (citation omitted). 
 47. 358 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1958). 
 48. Id. at 78 (explaining “[a]dverse testimony given [by a spouse against another spouse] in 
criminal proceedings would, we think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage”). 
 49. The Hawkins Court upheld the portion of the common law rule that allowed either spouse to 
prevent adverse testimony by reasoning that “there is still widespread belief, grounded on present 
conditions, that the law should not force or encourage testimony which might alienate husband and 
wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences.”  Id. at 79.  The Court further noted that the 
“basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband against wife in a trial where 
life or liberty is at stake was a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only 
for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as well.”  Id. at 77. 
 50. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 41–42. 
 51. Id. at 43–48.  The Court proceeded carefully because “the long history of the privilege 
suggests that it ought not to be casually set aside.”  Id. at 48. 
 52. Id. at 53. 
 53. Before the Trammel case, one court held that a spouse could not bar the testimony of 
another spouse if the testimony involved the commission of a crime against a child of either spouse.  
United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1366–67 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding no adverse-spousal-
testimony privilege where the charge against a husband was the attempted rape of his twelve-year-
old daughter). 
 54. As one scholar explains: 
Evidence scholars have offered four historical bases for the common law view that 
spouses were not competent witnesses for or against each other: 
(1) The common law unity of husband and wife.  Upon marriage, the wife lost 
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were incompetent to testify against each other,55 it began to distinguish 
itself as a separate privilege.56  In 1934, the Supreme Court expressly 
recognized the confidential-marital-communications privilege in Wolfle 
v. United States.57  In Wolfle, the defendant-husband wrote a letter to his 
wife by dictating its contents to a stenographer who then transcribed the 
letter.58  The Court held the communication was not privileged since it 
was made in the presence of a third party.59  The Court reasoned:  
Communications between the spouses, privately made, are generally 
assumed to have been intended to be confidential, and hence they are 
privileged; but, wherever a communication, because of its nature or the 
circumstances under which it was made, was obviously not intended to 
be confidential, it is not a privileged communication.60 
                                                                                                                       
her separate identity, and the husband and wife became a legal unity, 
represented by the husband.  Only he could sue or be sued.  If the wife had an 
action, it had to be brought in the husband’s name.  Since parties were 
incompetent as witnesses, the husband could not testify.  Therefore neither 
could his alter ego, his wife. 
(2) The marital identity of interest.  Even apart from the spouses’ legal 
identity, their interest in the outcome of any lawsuit would be the same.  
Hence, the rationale for the party’s incompetency applied equally to the 
party’s spouse. 
(3) The assumed bias of affection.  Because of the spouses’ intimate 
relationship and strong feelings for each other, their testimony was deemed 
incredible. 
(4) Public policy.  There might be interference with marital harmony if the 
wife could be called to give unfavorable testimony against her husband.  Even 
if the wife gave favorable testimony on direct examination, on cross-
examination she may be required to give damaging testimony. 
Damian P. Richard, Expanding the “Child of Either” Exception to the Husband-Wife Privilege 
Under the New M.R.E. 504(D), 60 A.F. L. REV. 155, 157 n.9 (2007) (quoting RONALD CARLSON ET 
AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 168 (4th ed. 
1997)); see also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2227 (John T. 
McNaughton ed. rev. ed. 1961) (discussing the history of the privilege to testify against one’s wife 
or husband). 
 55. Richard, supra note 54, at 158–59. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 7 (1934). 
 58. Id. at 12. 
 59. Id. at 16–17.  Generally, when a third party overhears the communication, it will not be 
privileged.  One exception to this is when the recipient-spouse voluntarily reveals the confidential 
communication to a third-party: “Where the recipient-spouse colludes with a third party to betray the 
trust of the communicating spouse, courts seek to protect the trust upon which the communicating 
spouse relied when confiding in the recipient-spouse.”  Mikah K. Story, Twenty-First Century 
Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital Communications Privilege to Electronic Mail, 58 S.C. L. 
REV. 275, 280 (2006). 
 60. Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 (explaining that the reasoning behind the privilege “is the protection 
of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to 
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Wolfle sets the legal framework of the marital-communications 
privilege.  “[M]arital communications are presumptively confidential.”61  
Thus, the party seeking to introduce the privileged communication bears 
the burden to overcome this presumption.62  This privilege, however, can 
be waived if a third party is present during the communication.63  These 
requirements for the marital-communications privilege were reaffirmed 
in 1951.64 
The marital privileges have elicited different reactions and degrees of 
support.  The adverse-spousal-testimony privilege—grounded for the 
most part in the rationale of spousal incompetence—met with fierce 
criticism,65 while the confidential-marital-communications privilege—
grounded in the rationale of privilege—has been relatively less 
controversial and “enjoys widespread acceptance in the marital 
context.”66  Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the adverse-
spousal-testimony privilege be completely abolished and that the law 
only allow for the marital-communications privilege.67 
Though historically criticism was levied against the adverse-spousal-
testimony privilege,68 the 1975 proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 
                                                                                                                       
outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice which the privilege entails”). 
 61. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951). 
 62. Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1456 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 63. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 (explaining there is no 
privilege where the statements are made to, or in the presence of, third parties). 
 64. Blau, 340 U.S. 332–34.  In Blau, the Court emphasized that the communications were 
presumptively confidential and the party seeking to introduce the privileged evidence has the burden 
to overcome the presumption that the comments were made confidentially.  Id. at 333–34. 
 65. For example, Professor Dean Wigmore criticized the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege as 
“the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice.” 8 
WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2228, at 221. 
 66. Regan, supra note 33, at 2057; see also Barbara Gregg Glenn, The Deconstruction of the 
Marital Privilege, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 729 (1985).  This is not to say the communications 
privilege is without its critics.  Some opponents argue the privilege impedes the truth-seeking 
process while others argue the privilege is unnecessary since most married couples do not know it 
exists.  Story, supra note 59, at 280. 
 67. “In [adverse spousal testimony’s] place, Wigmore and others suggested a privilege 
protecting only private marital communications, modeled on the privilege between priest and 
penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient.”  Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 
(1980) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2227).  The Court explained, however: “This Court 
recognized just such a confidential marital communications privilege in [Wolfle and Blau].  In 
neither case, however, did the Court adopt the Wigmore view that the communications privilege be 
substituted in place of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony.”  Id. at 45 n.5 (citation 
omitted). 
 68. See W.I.T., Jr., Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal 
Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern Trend, 38 
VA. L. REV. 359, 373–75 (1952). 
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eliminated the confidential-marital-communications privilege but kept 
the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege.69  Congress debated the 
revisions and delayed enactment of the rules for two years in part 
because of the marital privileges.70  The proposal to abolish the marital-
communication privilege met with fierce opposition by some who saw it 
as key to marital harmony.  Professor Charles Black wrote a letter to 
Congressman William L. Hungate opposing the 1975 proposed Federal 
Rules.71  He believed eliminating the communications privilege would 
violate marital privacy: 
[T]he meaning of the Rule (made entirely clear in the Advisory 
Committee’s comments) is that, however intimate, however private, 
however embarrassing may be a disclosure by one spouse to another, or 
some fact discovered, within the privacies of marriage, by one spouse 
about another, that disclosure of fact can be wrung from the spouse 
under penalty of being held in contempt of court, if it is thought barely 
relevant to the issues in anybody’s lawsuit for breach of a contract to 
sell a carload of apples. . . .  It seems clear to me that this Rule trenches 
on the area of marital privacy so staunchly defended by the Supreme 
Court . . . .72 
Despite Professor Black’s concerns, the Advisory Committee 
reasoned that because most married couples were unaware of the marital-
communications privilege, it probably had little influence on how 
spouses conducted themselves inside the marriage.73 
                                                     
 69. Story, supra note 59, at 280.  The text of the Proposed (and rejected) Federal Rule 505, 
stated in relevant part: 
  (a) General rule of privilege.  An accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to 
prevent his spouse from testifying against him. 
  (b) Who may claim the privilege.  The privilege may be claimed by the accused or 
by the spouse on his behalf.  The authority of the spouse to do so is presumed in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary. 
  (c) Exceptions.  There is no privilege under this rule (1) in proceedings in which one 
spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of the other or of a child of 
either . . . . 
25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 34, 425–26.  The Advisory Notes to the Proposed Rule 505 
expressly stated: “The rule recognizes no privilege for confidential communications.”  Id. at 426. 
 70. Mullane, supra note 36.  See generally 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5571 
(exploring the statutory history of Proposed Rule 505). 
 71. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and Physician Privileges—A Reprint of a Letter to a 
Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 48 (1975). 
 72. Id. at 47. 
 73. Story, supra note 59, at 281.  “The Committee believed that marriage is not primarily a 
verbal relationship, and therefore declining to recognize a confidential communication privilege 
would not have as great an impact on the institution of marriage as it would on professional 
relationships.”  R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. J. 
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Congress ultimately decided to abandon any evidence rule providing 
for a specific privilege.74  Instead, Congress adopted a single rule, 501, 
which provides in relevant part that all evidentiary privileges in the 
federal courts would be “governed by the principles of the common law 
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light 
of reason and experience.”75  By adopting this single evidentiary rule, 
Congress “acknowledge[d] the authority of the federal courts to continue 
the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges in federal 
criminal trials”  leaving the law of the marital privileges in their present 
state. 
III. CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
CONFIDENTIAL-MARITAL-COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE IN CHILD-
MOLESTATION CASES 
All fifty states have codified the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege 
and the confidential-marital-communications privilege.76  The military 
                                                                                                                       
CRIM. L. 339, 362 (2006). 
 74. The Advisory Committee proposed that Article V of the Federal Rules contain thirteen rules 
relating to privilege.  FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note.  Congress, however, rejected this 
proposal because there was some concern the specific thirteen rules included modifications to 
common law privileges which might be unconstitutional or raise federalism concerns.  Id. 
 75. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in full: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act 
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, 
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall 
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the 
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.  However, in civil 
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which 
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, 
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law. 
FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 76. See ALA. R. EVID. 504; ALASKA R. EVID. 505; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2231 to -2232  
(Supp. 2009); ARK. R. EVID. 504; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 970–973 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-90-107 (West Supp. 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West 2009); DEL. R. 
EVID. 504; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-21, -23 (West 2003); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203 (West 2006); 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/8-801 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(4) (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.  
§ 622.9 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-423, -428 (2005); KY. R. EVID. 504; 
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 504 (2006); art. 505 (Supp. 2010); ME. R. EVID. 504; MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 9-105, -106 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2000); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (West Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 2010); 
MISS. R. EVID. 504; MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-802 (2009); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.295 to .305 (West 2004); 
N.H. R. EVID. 504; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-16 (West Supp. 2010); § 2A:84A-22 (West 1994); 
N.M. R. EVID. 11-505; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4502(b) (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-57(c) 
(West 2000); N.D. R. EVID. 504; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(D) (West Supp. 2009);  
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and the District of Columbia have also codified both privileges.77  Three 
common exceptions to the privileges exist.78  First, the privilege 
generally does not apply in cases where the communication concerns 
present or future criminal activity.79  Second, the privilege generally does 
not apply in cases involving crimes against the spouse.80  Third, the 
privilege does not apply for a crime against the child of either spouse.81 
The remaining portion of this Article examines how this third 
exception applies to the marital-communications privilege in child-
molestation cases.  The Article focuses on the confidential-marital-
communications privilege because it is broader in scope than the 
adverse-spousal-testimony privilege.  The defendant has much more 
power to invoke the marital-communications privilege because it is the 
nontestifying spouse that holds the privilege for all communications 
made during the marriage.  Thus, unlike the adverse-spousal-testimony 
privilege, it does not matter whether the spouse wants to testify about the 
communications or whether the marriage has been terminated—the 
nontestifying spouse can prevent the testimony.82  As argued in the 
remainder of this Article, however, it is in precisely these cases, where 
child molestation has occurred, that a spouse who wants to testify should 
not be prevented from doing so.  Many jurisdictions carve out an 
exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege, but only  
 
                                                                                                                       
§ 2921.22(G)(1) (West Supp. 2010); § 2945.42 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2504 
(West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.255 (West 2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5913–5914, 
5923–5926 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-17-13 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 
(1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-12 to -15 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201 (West 
2002); TEX. R. EVID. 504; UTAH R. EVID. 502; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (West 2007); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (West Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West 2009); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-3-3 to 57-3-4 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West 2000); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-12-101(a)(iii), 104 (West 2007). 
 77. MILITARY R. EVID. 504; D.C. CODE § 14-306 (Supp. 2010). 
 78. See generally Richard, supra note 54, at 160–61 (discussing spousal incapacity and 
confidential communication privileges and various exceptions related to them). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730–31 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Parker, 834 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding that the marital-communications privilege does 
not apply to on-going or future crimes in which both spouses are participants).  There is, however, a 
split among the Circuits with regard to this “partner in crime” exception.  The Sixth and the Eighth 
Circuits have ruled that the “partner in crime exception” is narrowly construed to only those 
“communications regarding ‘patently illegal activity.’”  United States v. Evans, 966 F.2d 398, 401 
(8th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1243 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
 80. See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 526–27 (1960) (finding an exception to the 
adverse-spousal-testimony privilege where the offense charged was against the spouse). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1367 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding an exception 
to the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege where the offense charged was against the child of either 
spouse). 
 82. See United States v. Woods, 924 F.2d 399, 401–02 (1st Cir. 1991). 
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in cases where the crime is against the “child of either spouse.”  This 
exception is too narrow. 
A. The Problem of the Narrow Exception of “Child of Either Spouse” 
Because the child-of-either-spouse exception is too narrow, 
unreasonable legal analysis results.  Two cases exemplify this problem.  
In the 2003 military case of United States v. McCollum, the defendant 
admitted to his wife that he raped her fourteen-year-old, mentally 
handicapped sister who was residing with the couple for about one 
month during the summer.83  The defendant claimed that the statements 
he made to his wife about the rape were confidential marital 
communications and, thus, entitled to privilege.84  The military evidence 
rule, at that time,85  provided an exception to the privilege in 
“proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a crime against the . . . 
child of either.”86  The government argued that the language “child of 
either” should include those children considered to be “de facto” 
children.87  The court disagreed and found that the intent of the drafters 
was that “child of either” “applies to only those situations in which a 
child is the biological child of one of the spouses” or “legally recognized 
child.”88  Thus, the court held that a de facto child did not constitute a 
                                                     
 83. United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 334 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 
 84. Id. at 334–35. 
 85. After the McCollum case, that Military Evidence Rule at issue was amended so that the 
exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege was much broader and included “not 
only a biological child, adopted child, or ward of one of the spouses but also include[d] a child who 
is under the permanent or temporary physical custody of one of the spouses, regardless of the 
existence of a legal parent-child relationship.”  See MILITARY R. EVID. 504(c)(2)(A); see also 
Richard, supra note 54, at 171 n.82 (stating the full text of the proposed subsection (d) to Military 
Rule of Evidence 504). 
 86. McCollum, 58 M.J. at 340. 
 87. Id. at 340. 
 88. The court explained: 
Given the significant social and legal policy implications of extending the privilege with 
respect to custodial relationships with children, we would expect such an intent to be 
represented in express language, rather than pressed or squeezed from the present text.  
Therefore, we think the better view is that “child of either,” as used in M.R.E. 
504(c)(2)(A), applies to only those situations in which a child is the biological child of 
one of the spouses, the legally recognized child, or ward of one of the spouses.  
. . . . 
  Whether a de facto child exception to the marital communications privilege should 
apply to courts-martial is a legal policy question best addressed by the political and 
policy-making elements of the government. 
Id. at 340, 342. 
1GOODNO FINAL 11/5/2010  7:53:41 AM 
2010] PROTECTING “ANY CHILD” 15 
child under the exception to the marital-communications privilege.89  
Because the defendant’s sister-in-law was not a legally recognized ward 
of either spouse, the court found that the defendant correctly asserted that 
the marital-confidential-communications privilege protected his wife’s 
testimony.90 
In the recent 2009 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Banks, the 
Court extended the exception to include a de facto child of either spouse, 
but even this slight extension led to unreasonable legal analysis.91  In 
Banks, during a search of the defendant’s home, the authorities found a 
pornographic video of the defendant’s two-year-old grandson.92  The 
defendant was charged with criminal counts relating to “possession, 
production, transportation and receipt of images depicting minors 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”93  During the trial, the defendant’s 
wife testified that the defendant had admitted to her that he made the 
video of their grandson.94  Although the defendant objected, claiming the 
marital-communications privilege protected his wife’s testimony, the 
trial court allowed the wife’s testimony.95  The defendant was found 
guilty; key to this ruling was the wife’s testimony.96 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the confidential-marital-
communications privilege did not apply to statements “relating to a crime 
where one spouse or a spouse’s children are the victims.”97  The Ninth 
Circuit explained that when there was a child “functionally equivalent” 
to that of the natural child, the exception to the marital-communications 
privilege should extend.98  However, in applying this narrowly drawn 
                                                     
 89. Id. at 341. 
 90. Id. at 341, 343.  While the court held that it was error to admit the wife’s testimony, the 
court found the error harmless.  Id. at 343.  The court explained: “Although the qualitative nature of 
Appellant’s statements makes resolution of this issue a close one, we conclude that the other 
evidence against Appellant was sufficiently incriminating that Appellant would have been convicted 
even if his statements had been properly excluded.”  Id.  In the concurring opinion, Chief Judge 
Crawford expanded the exception to the privilege and concluded that the term “child of either” 
should include de facto children.  Id. at 344 (Crawford, J., concurring).  Crawford found an 
overriding public policy interest which emphasized the importance of protecting children from 
abuse.  Id. (citing Dunn v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting the 
“child of either” language in California’s exception to the confidential-marital-communications 
privilege to include a foster child)). 
 91. 556 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 92. Id. at 971. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 974 (citing United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1136 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 98. Id. at 975 (“Considering the comparable familial ties, we conclude that violence against the 
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exception in Banks, the Ninth Circuit found that the exception to the 
marital-communications privilege should not extend in the instant case.99  
The court held that the grandson was not the functional equivalent of a 
natural child, despite the two-year-old grandson living with the defendant 
for six months.100 
Banks and McCollum exemplify the problem with a narrowly 
construed exception to the confidential-marital-communications 
privilege when the communications concern child molestation.  It is 
unreasonable and against public policy to limit the exception to only 
communications concerning the biological child of either spouse or even 
slightly broadening the exception to include communications only 
concerning a de facto child.  No significant difference exists between a 
crime against a biological child of a married couple, against a child 
visiting the home, against a grandson, or against any child; the general 
welfare of all children outweigh any benefit in keeping communications 
confidential in a marriage that has been deeply compromised by the 
confessions of a criminal and deviant sexual act.101  Nevertheless, state 
laws and the federal courts are divergent in their application of 
exceptions to the confidential-marital-communications privilege in child-
molestation cases. 
B. The Response of the States 
State laws concerning exceptions to the use of the confidential-
marital-communications privilege in child-molestation cases are 
inconsistent.  The Appendix to this Article, in Part VI, surveys the  
 
                                                                                                                       
functional equivalent of a child should be afforded the same protections as violence against the birth 
or step-child of a married couple.”). 
 99. The Ninth Circuit explained: 
This is not a case in which a child was raised by grandparents and, therefore, could be 
said to share a parent/child relationship with those caretakers.  Rather, this situation 
demonstrates a strong grandparent/grandchild relationship.  Although such a relationship 
is important to building strong extended families and improving society, it is not the type 
that creates the same overriding policy concerns that led us to limit the marital 
communications privilege to protect children of the marriage. 
Id. at 976. 
 100. Id.  Despite the finding that the district court erred in the application of the exception to the 
marital-communication privilege, the court found this error to be harmless.  Id. at 978.  The court 
held that even in the absence of the wife’s testimony that defendant admitted to making the video, 
the district court still would have found the defendant to be guilty based on items shown in the video 
linking the video to the defendant and based on the testimony of the other witnesses.  Id. at 977–78. 
 101. See infra Part IV. 
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relevant law in all jurisdictions and divides the laws into three general 
categories (from narrowest to broadest). 
1. Category 1: Child-of-Either-Spouse Exception (Includes De Facto 
Parental Status) 
Laws which fit into this category have language similar to what was 
litigated in McCollum and Banks.  For example, in Kansas, the 
confidential-marital-communications privilege does not apply “in a 
criminal action in which one of them is charged with a crime against the 
person . . . of a child of either.”102  The child-of-either-spouse is the 
narrowest exception because it is only applicable in cases when a case 
concerns the abuse and molestation of a biological child or legally 
recognized child of either spouse. 
Thirteen states have adopted this narrow exception.103  Ten of these 
thirteen states have extended “child of either” to cover those situations in 
which the child is in the care or custody of either spouse and where the 
spouses are acting as de facto parents,104 including foster children.105  
                                                     
 102. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428(b)(3) (2005). 
 103. ALASKA R. EVID. 505(b)(2)(A); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-16 (West 2008); 735 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-801 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428(b)(3); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 595.02.1a (West 2010); N.H. R. EVID. 504; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.295(2)(e)(1) (West 2004); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17(2)(b) (West Supp. 2010); § 2A:84A-22 (West 1994); N.M. R. EVID.  
§ 11-505(1); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(D) (West Supp. 2009); § 2945.42 (West 2006); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201(b)(2) (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West 
2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-3-3, -4 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West 2000). 
 104. ALASKA R. EVID. 505(b)(2)(A); CAL. EVID. CODE § 972(e)(1) (West 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/115-16; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-801; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(a); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.295(2)(e)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-17(2)(b), -22; N.M. R. EVID. § 11-
505(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201(b)(2); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 905.05; see also Appendix infra Part VI. 
 105. See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 681 P.2d 341, 345 (Alaska 1984) (finding that the adverse-
spousal-testimony privilege rule, the language of which is analogous to Alaska’s confidential-
marital-communications privilege rule, extended to a “foster child”); Dunn v. Superior Court, 26 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 367 (Ct. App. 1993) (extending child-of-either exception to foster children); State 
v. Michels, 414 N.W.2d 311, 316 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (holding same).  In expanding the child-of-
either exception to include foster children, one court explained: 
  The husband-wife privilege exists to encourage marital confidences and thereby 
preserve the marital relationship.  The “child of either” exception was created to permit 
prosecution for crimes committed within the family unit.  Such crimes would normally 
have no other witnesses and would go unpunished in the event the exception in the statute 
were not permitted to operate. 
  In light of the purpose of the exception, we conclude that a foster child is properly 
included within the “child of either” category . . . . This purpose would not be served by 
affording protection to only those children of a family unit with legal or biological 
relationships.  Rather, it is to ensure that those individuals, particularly minor children, 
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Four of the thirteen states in this category, however, have not yet 
specifically expanded their state statutes from biological or legal “child 
of either” to include de facto parental situations.106 
2. Category 2: Child-Residing-in-the-Home Exception (De Facto 
Parental Status Unnecessary) 
Laws which fit into this second category are broader than the child-
of-either-spouse exception because it is unnecessary to establish a de 
facto parental status for the exception to apply.  This exception extends 
to a child who is living in the home but who is neither a biological child 
of either spouse, nor in the care or custody of either spouse.  State 
statutes that fall into this category track language similar to that found in 
Utah’s statute, which provides that the confidential-marital-
communications privilege does not apply “[i]n a proceeding in which one 
spouse is charged with a crime or a tort against the person or property 
of . . . (ii) a child of either, [or] (iii) a person residing in the household of 
either . . . .”107  Eleven states and the District of Columbia fall into this 
category.108 
Some courts have gone to great lengths to try to extend this 
exception.  For example, after a laborious analysis of the history of the 
definition of “residing,” one court interpreted the statutory term to 
include a child who had been “visiting” the home for four days when the 
incident occurred.109  However, courts should not have to apply such 
tortured reasoning to extend the exception; instead, all state legislatures 
should adopt the any-child exception. 
                                                                                                                       
who are present in the home and are actively a part of the family structure are protected, 
via criminal prosecution, for crimes committed against them. 
Michels, 414 N.W.2d at 315–16 (citations omitted). 
 106. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428(b)(3); N.H. R. EVID. 504; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§§ 2317.02(D), 2945.42; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-3-3, -4.; see also Appendix infra Part VI. 
 107. UTAH R. EVID. 502(4)(c) (emphasis added). 
 108. ALA. R. EVID. 504(d)(3); ARK. R. EVID. 504(d); DEL. R. EVID. 504(d); D.C. CODE § 14-
306(b-1)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1(c) (West 2008); KY. R. EVID. 
504(c)(2); ME. R. EVID. 504(d); N.D. R. EVID. 504(d); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2504(d) (West 
2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-13, -15 (2004); UTAH R. EVID. 502(4)(c); VT. R. EVID. 
504(d). 
 109. Munson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ark. 1998) (holding that exception to confidential-
marital-communications privilege applied to child “residing” in home for a visit of four days). 
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3. Category 3: Any-Child Exception 
The any-child exception is the broadest exception to the confidential-
marital-communications privilege because it applies to communications 
involving the molestation110 of any child, including biological children, 
grandchildren, neighbors’ children, and children without any connection 
to the family home.  State statutes that fall into this category track 
language similar to that found in Mississippi’s statute, which provides 
that there is no confidential-marital-communications privilege where 
“one spouse is charged with a crime against (1) the person of any minor 
child.”111  While adoption of the any-child exception is a relatively new 
trend,112 currently twenty-five states have adopted this broad standard.113 
In sum, the states are split.  Approximately half have adopted the 
narrower exceptions—categories one and two—to the confidential-
marital-communications privilege, and half have recently adopted the 
                                                     
 110. This Article is limited to the exceptions to the confidential-marital-communications 
privilege in child-molestation cases.  There are clear arguments that can be made to extend this 
exception to all child abuse cases; however, the analysis and theory as to why it should be extended 
to the broader crime of child abuse is the subject of another article.  Some state statutes have been 
written specifically to carve out sexual abuse cases from other child abuse cases.  See, e.g., 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5913 (West 2000) (applying an exception to the confidential-marital-
communications privilege for sex crimes when any child is the victim of the crime but applying the 
exception only to a child in the “care or custody” of either spouse when the child is a victim of all 
other crimes).  There are, however, state statutes that extend the any-child exception to all types of 
abuse cases.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2232(2) (Supp. 2009) (carving out an exception 
for all “criminal action[s]”); IDAHO R. EVID. 504(d)(1) (“In a criminal or civil action or proceeding 
as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the physical, mental or emotional condition of 
or injury to a child, or concerning the welfare of a child including, but not limited to the abuse, 
abandonment or neglect of a child.”). 
 111. MISS. R. EVID. 504(d) (emphasis added). 
 112. United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 341 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (noting that as of 2003 “only 
five states ha[d] recognized an exception to the marital communications privilege for offenses 
against a child who is not the biological or adopted child of one of the spouses”). 
 113. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2232(2); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107 (West Supp. 
2009); § 14-13-310 (West 2005); § 18-6-401.1 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-21, 54-
84a (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.504(3)(b), 39.204 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-
21(1), -23(b) (West 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(1) (West 2006); IDAHO R. EVID. 504(D)(1); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-11-1 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); § 34-46-3-1(4) (West 1999); IOWA CODE 
ANN. §§ 232.74, 622.9 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 504(c)(1), (4) (2006); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B) (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 9-105, 9-
106(a)(1) (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 600.2162 (West Supp. 2010); MISS. R. EVID. 504(d); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.140, 
546.260(2) (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-802, 41-3-437(5) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 27-505(3)(a) (West 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4502(b) (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 8-57(c), 8-57.1 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.255(4)(a) (West 2003); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 5913(2), 5923; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-17-13, 12-17-10.1 (West 2006); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 19-11-30 (1985); TEX. EVID. RULE 504(a)(4)(C); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (West Supp. 
2010); § 19.2-271.2(iii) (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-12-101(a)(iii), 14-3-210(a)(i) (West 2007). 
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broader any-child exception—category three.114  As set forth in Section 
IV, the states that have adopted the narrower exception should amend 
their statutes to encompass the any-child exception. 
C. The Response of the Federal Courts 
While the states are split, no federal court of appeals has adopted the 
any-child exception to the confidential-marital-communications 
privilege.  Indeed, only two courts of appeals, the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits, have squarely addressed this issue, and they are split on what 
the standard should be.  The Ninth Circuit has adopted the narrowest 
standard and falls into category one—child-of-either-spouse standard.  
The Tenth Circuit falls into category two—child-residing-in-the-home 
standard.115 
The Tenth Circuit adopted the child-residing-in-the-home standard in 
the case United States v. Bahe.116  The defendant in Bahe molested an 
eleven-year-old female relative who was visiting the family household.117  
At trial, the defendant’s wife attempted to provide testimony concerning 
how the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse.118  This testimony was 
important to the government because this was the same allegation made 
by the eleven-year-old victim.119  The district court, however, excluded 
the wife’s testimony on the ground that the testimony was a protected 
form of communication under the marital-communications privilege.120 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that while the testimony 
constituted a confidential marital communication, it was subject to an 
exception.121  The court recognized that no other circuit had extended the 
exception beyond a case where the defendant was charged with an 
offense against the “children of either” spouse, which presented a 
problem in the current case because the child was a relative, not a 
biological child of either spouse.122  The court, however, held that no 
                                                     
 114. See Appendix infra Part VI. 
 115. See supra Part III.B for further explanation of the categories. 
 116. 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying an exception to the confidential-marital-
communications privilege when the communication concerns a crime against a “minor child within 
the household”). 
 117. Id. at 1441. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1445. 
 121. Id. at 1446. 
 122. Id. at 1445–46; see also United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that an exception to the marital-communications privilege applied in a case where the 
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significant difference existed between a crime against the child of a 
spouse and the crime against a relative child in the home.123  The court 
reasoned: 
We see no significant difference, as a policy matter, between a crime 
against a child of the married couple, against a stepchild living in the 
home or, as here, against an eleven-year-old relative visiting in the 
home.  Child abuse is a horrendous crime.  It generally occurs in the 
home and is often covered up by the innocence of small children and by 
threats against disclosure.124 
When this same issue was raised in the Ninth Circuit in United States 
v. Banks, the court refused to adopt the Bahe standard.125  The Ninth 
Circuit criticized Bahe explaining: “No other circuit has adopted such a 
broad exemption to the federal marital communications privilege.”126  
After rejecting the Bahe standard, the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
narrowest exception, the child-of-either-spouse standard127 and, thus, 
held the privilege did not apply to communications made by the 
defendant to his wife concerning the molestation of their grandson.128  
Even though the Bahe standard is somewhat broader than the standard 
adopted in Banks, both Circuits rejected adopting the broadest any-child 
exception. 
While the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are the only federal courts of 
appeal that have addressed this issue, a few other cases from district 
courts in other circuits are on point.129  One district court in the Fifth 
Circuit, for example, has attempted to extend the exception to the any-
child standard,130 but it remains to be seen if the Fifth Circuit will follow 
                                                                                                                       
defendant was charged with a crime against the child of his wife). 
 123. Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1446. 
 124. Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884–85 (10th Cir. 
1998) (citing Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1441) (holding that wife of defendant charged with sexual abuse of 
his daughters fell within exception to marital-communications privilege for spousal testimony 
relating to abuse of minor child within the household). 
 125. 556 F.3d 967, 975 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 126. Id. 
 127. White, 974 F.2d at 1138. 
 128. Banks, 556 F.3d at 976; see also supra Part III.A. 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Mavroules, 813 F. Supp. 115, 120 (D. Mass. 1993) (recognizing 
that “‘[p]rotecting threats against . . . a spouse’s children is inconsistent with the marital 
communications privilege’” (quoting White, 974 F.2d at 1138)). 
 130. In United States v. Martinez, the wife attempted to claim privilege over communications she 
made to her husband concerning abuse of her children.  44 F. Supp. 2d 835, 836 (W.D. Tex. 1999).  
The court held that these communications were not privileged.  Id.  Although the issue before the 
Martinez court concerned the abuse of the “children of either” spouse, the holding of the court was 
broader, adopting the any-child standard: 
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the lead of this district court.  The next Part sets forth the analysis for 
how the Fifth Circuit, all other federal courts of appeals, and state 
legislatures should address the issue. 
IV. FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE LEGISLATURES SHOULD ADOPT THE 
ANY-CHILD EXCEPTION TO THE CONFIDENTIAL-MARITAL-
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE 
A. Why Adopt the Any-Child Exception? 
What is unique about child-molestation cases as opposed to murder, 
for example, which leads to the conclusion that federal courts and state 
legislatures should adopt the broad any-child exception to the 
confidential-marital-communications privilege?  This Part answers that 
question and then sets forth the legal analysis for how federal courts and 
state legislatures can justify adopting the any-child exception.  There are 
four reasons why the any-child exception should be adopted. 
1. Child Molestation Is a Unique Crime in that It Is Often Difficult to 
Prosecute Due to the Lack of Witness Testimony and Physical 
Evidence 
The Supreme Court has recognized that child abuse is “one of the 
most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute.”131  There are a number of 
reasons why child molestation, in particular, is difficult to prosecute.132  
First, there are often no witnesses to child sexual abuse except the child-
victim.133  If the child is young, like the two-year-old grandson in the 
                                                                                                                       
[I]n a case where one spouse is accused of abusing minor children, society’s interest in 
the administration of justice far outweighs its interest in protecting whatever harmony or 
trust may at that point still remain in the marital relationship.  “Reason and experience” 
dictate that the marital communications privilege should not apply to statements relating 
to a crime where the victim is a minor child. 
Id. at 837. 
 131. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987); see also In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d 914, 
915 (N.Y. 1987) (stating that “once abuse is uncovered it is difficult to fix blame”); David M. De La 
Paz, Sacrificing the Whole Truth: Florida’s Deteriorating Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence in 
Cases of Child Sexual Abuse, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 449, 449 (1999) (explaining that “many 
cases of child sexual abuse are difficult for prosecutors to prove”); Meridith Felise Sopher, “The 
Best of All Possible Worlds”: Balancing Victims’ and Defendants’ Rights in the Child Sexual Abuse 
Case, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 643 (1994) (citing Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39). 
 132. See generally ROBERT L. SNOW, SEX CRIMES INVESTIGATION: CATCHING AND 
PROSECUTING THE PERPETRATORS 109–29 (2006) (discussing the process of child-molestation 
investigations); CHERYL WETZSTEIN, THE COMPLEX NATURE OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (2001). 
 133. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60 (finding that child abuse is hard to prosecute “in large part because 
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Banks case,134 then the child may be developmentally unable to testify.  
Certainly, in the case of an infant, it would be impossible for the child to 
testify.  Even if the child is old enough to testify, the courtroom 
experience can be extremely traumatic for the child.  This is often 
increased by the close proximity of the defendant in the courtroom135 and 
is “particularly acute when the abuser is a parent.”136  Traumatized child-
victims can be afraid to tell the entire truth and also can have blurred 
memories, which, in turn, raises concern of witness credibility.137  
Because child sexual abuse generally occurs in secret, it is difficult to 
find witnesses.138  Thus, to ensure prosecution of child molesters, anyone 
                                                                                                                       
there often are no witnesses except the victim”); Sopher, supra note 131, at 643. 
 134. United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 975–76 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a two-year-old 
grandson was not a “child of either spouse” for purposes of the exception to the confidential-marital-
communications privilege); see also supra Part III.A of this Article addressing Banks. 
 135. Sopher, supra note 131, at 644; see also In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d at 915 (asserting that 
victims are generally reluctant to testify in child sexual abuse cases); State v. Jones, 722 P.2d 496, 
499 (Wash. 1989) (stating that children are ineffective witnesses because they are often “intimidated 
and confused by courtroom processes, embarrassed at having to describe sexual matters, and 
uncomfortable in their role as accuser of a defendant who may be a parent, other relative or friend”); 
KENNETH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 90–91 (5th ed. 2010) 
(explaining that pedophiles will sometimes use pornography of the victim to blackmail the child, 
ensuring the child will keep the sexual abuse a secret); Peter T. Wendel, The Case Against Plea 
Bargaining Child Sexual Abuse Charges: “Deja Vu All Over Again”, 64 MO. L. REV. 317, 322 
(1999) (describing the trial in child sexual abuse cases as “little more than a ‘swearing match’ 
between a nervous, embarrassed thirteen-year-old boy and . . . a successful, well-liked prominent 
sports figure backed by a group of players’ parents”); Michelle Ann Scott, Note, Self-Defense and 
the Child Parricide Defendant: Should Courts Make a Distinction Between the Battered Woman and 
the Battered Child?, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 351, 363 (1996) (explaining that in cases of child abuse 
generally, “abused children develop the delusion that their parents are actually good.  Such children 
assume blame for the abuse, rather than attributing it to the parent”). 
 136. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60. 
 137. Sopher, supra note 131, at 644–45; see also Jones, 772 P.2d at 499 (stating that “children’s 
memories of abuse may have dimmed with the passage of time”); Clara Gimenez, Note, Vermont 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts in the “Context” of Child Molestation 
Cases, 27 VT. L. REV. 217, 234 (2002) (explaining that “the court referred to studies that show that 
despite the relative frequency of child sexual abuse, ‘many people, including juries and judges, find 
it difficult to believe [child sexual abuse] happens;’” it is difficult “to believe that an ‘ordinary’ 
parent would sexually abuse [their] child”); De La Paz, supra note 131, at 450 (explaining that child 
molesters “carefully select their victims and opportunities” to commit the crime, and as such, “child 
molesters can effectively raise doubts in the minds of jurors by simply alleging that the child victim 
is lying or that the child’s testimony is the product of improper influence”); Judy Yun, Note, A 
Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 
1745, 1750–51 (1983) (explaining that the child’s memory fades over time and the child is often 
unable to recollect details because of the lapse of time between the time of the crime and the trial). 
 138. Sopher, supra note 131, at 643; see also Tadic v. State, 635 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2006) (stating that “sexual offenses against children necessarily occur in secret”); In re Nicole V., 
518 N.E.2d at 915 (finding that because of the nonviolent nature of child sexual abuse, the abuse is 
generally in secret and is, therefore, difficult to detect); Jones, 772 P.2d at 499 (stating that “[a]cts of 
abuse generally occur in private”); De La Paz, supra note 131, at 449 (explaining that child sexual 
molestation is a “crime of opportunity” in which the assailant initiates the act when the assailant is 
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who can testify about child sexual abuse, including a spouse, should be 
allowed to testify.139 
Second, there is often little physical evidence in child-molestation 
cases.140  The signs of physical molestation are rare because medical 
examinations only show “evidence of sexual abuse in twenty to thirty 
percent” of cases.141  The nature of the abuse, generally consisting of 
“lewd fondling, digital penetration, or the child being forced to perform 
sex acts upon the assailant,” results in little physical evidence.142  
Moreover, physical evidence is rare because children often “succumb 
easily” and do not try to resist their sexual assailants and, thus, little 
physical evidence can be detected from the attack.143  Finally, frequently 
delays in reporting abuse decrease the likelihood of any physical 
evidence.144  Because of the lack of physical evidence in child sexual 
abuse cases, the only evidence often comes from the child who is forced 
to testify which, as set forth above, leads to difficulty in securing a 
conviction.145 
                                                                                                                       
alone with the child); Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 181 (1983) (explaining that the reality of child abuse is that it occurs 
“only when the child is alone with the offending adult, and it must never be shared with anyone 
else”); Gimenez, supra note 137, at 234 (stating that secretiveness is an issue that surrounds child 
sexual abuse); Melissa R. Saad, Note, Civil Commitment and the Sexually Violent Predator, 75 
DENV. U. L. REV. 595, 603 (1998) (stating that “the number of child sex abuse cases reported 
actually represents only a fraction of the actual number of offenses committed because of a 
significant number of clandestine incestuous incidents”); Yun, supra note 137, at 1750 (explaining 
that generally the only witnesses in child sex abuse cases are the victim and the perpetrator because 
“people simply do not molest children in front of others” and generally the molester is a relative or 
close acquaintance that is alone with the child on many occasions). 
 139. See, e.g., People v. Allman, 342 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899–900 (App. Div. 1973) (explaining that 
the prevention of testimony because of the confidential-marital-communications privilege would seal 
“the lips of the witnessing spouse . . . to the detriment of the child; and the injustice of the act may 
never be uncovered”). 
 140. Sopher, supra note 131, at 644; see also Jones, 772 P.2d at 499 (stating that “many cases 
leave no physical evidence”); Wendel, supra note 135, at 322 (explaining that it is often the problem 
in child sexual abuse cases that there is “no independent physical evidence corroborating the 
[child’s] claim”); Yun, supra note 137, at 1749–50 (explaining that “physical corroboration is rare” 
because the child sexual abuse crimes are “predominantly nonviolent in nature”). 
 141. Sopher, supra note 131, at 644; see also Saad, supra note 138, at 603 (explaining that the 
symptoms of child sex abuse victims are varied and sometimes nonexistent). 
 142. De La Paz, supra note 131, at 449. 
 143. Yun, supra note 137, at 1750; see also LANNING, supra note 135, at 181 (explaining that 
children are the “ideal victims” of sexual abuse because they are easily led by adults and they are 
taught to obey adults’ instructions). 
 144. Sopher, supra note 131, at 644. 
 145. Tadic v. State, 635 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (asserting that “more often than not 
the child/victim is the only witness able to provide such direct evidence”); see also In re Nicole V., 
518 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 1987) (finding that because of the secretive nature of the child sexual 
abuse, the child is usually the only witness); Jones, 772 P.2d at 499 (stating that “prosecutors must 
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Because of the difficulty in successfully prosecuting child sexual 
abuse, this crime, unlike others, requires a broad exception under the 
marital-communications privileges.  The prosecution of molestation 
cases presents the same problems regardless of whether the child is the 
biological child of the perpetrator, the neighbor’s child, or the child with 
no connection to the family home.  Thus, no logical reason limits the 
exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege only to 
children with connections to the family home.  Indeed, because child-
molestation cases are difficult to prove, courts have created exceptions to 
other evidentiary privileges but without any delineation of whether the 
child was a “child of either” spouse or a child “residing in the home.”146  
The exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege 
should follow the same route. 
2. Molestation of Any Child Negatively Impacts Marital Harmony, 
Which the Confidential-Marital-Communications Privilege 
Purportedly Protects 
The purpose of the confidential-marital-communications privilege is 
to promote marital harmony.147  The underlying policy is that spouses 
will more freely communicate with one another if they know that their 
deepest secrets will not later be exposed in a court.148  The societal 
benefit of marital harmony presumably resulting from free interspousal 
communication is deemed sufficiently important, on the whole, to 
outweigh the societal benefit of facilitating the fact-finding process in the 
judicial system.149  The very act of child molestation, however, strikes at 
                                                                                                                       
rely on the testimony of the child victim to make their cases”); Yun, supra note 137, at 1749 
(explaining that the child’s hearsay statement is often the only proof of the sexual abuse crime). 
 146. See, e.g., De La Paz, supra note 131, at 449 (explaining that under Florida law, “similar fact 
evidence” is allowed in some cases of child sexual abuse when the strict requirements under the rule 
are met); Yun, supra note 137, at 1749 (“[T]he principles underlying the hearsay rule require that an 
out-of-court statement be admissible only if the requisite need and reliability can be shown.  Because 
of the unique circumstances of child sex abuse, hearsay statements of the victim are especially 
necessary to establish the guilt of the defendant.”). 
 147. See United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 982 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We held in White that the 
critical question in determining if the marital communications privilege should apply is whether or 
not the conduct is ‘inconsistent with the purposes of the marital communications privilege: 
promoting confidential communications between spouses in order to foster marital harmony.’” 
(quoting United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992))). 
 148. United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The marital communications 
privilege . . . exists to insure that spouses . . . feel free to communicate their deepest feelings to each 
other without fear of eventual exposure in a court of law.” (quoting United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 
585, 590 (7th Cir. 1989))). 
 149. See id. 
1GOODNO FINAL 11/5/2010  7:53:41 AM 
26 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
the heart of marital harmony.  While undoubtedly child molestation is a 
heinous crime, it is also a clear violation of the marital vows.  Sexual 
abuse of a child does not further marital harmony; indeed, the very act 
suggests that the marriage is in shambles.150  When a child has been 
sexually abused, the bond of trust and confidence held so dearly in the 
marriage is most certainly broken; not only is the act of intimacy with 
another partner deceptive, but moreover, the act of intimacy by abusive 
means would likely break the trust and confidence in any marriage.  It 
does not further the sanctity of the marriage or the family relationship to 
allow one spouse to talk to another about child molestation with 
impunity.151 
Arguably, the insult to the spouse may be personally greater if it is 
his or her child that is molested by the other spouse.152  Regardless of the 
personal insult, however, the overall harm to marital harmony is the 
same whether it is a “child of either” spouse, a child “living in the 
home,” or a child previously unknown to the spouses.153  As one court 
explained: “It would be unconscionable to permit a privilege grounded 
on promoting communications of trust and love between marriage 
partners to prevent a properly outraged spouse with knowledge from 
testifying against the perpetrator of such a crime.”154  To argue the 
contrary—that confidentiality concerning child molestation would foster 
a stronger marital relationship—is irrational.  The societal benefit gained 
by public exposure of child molestation far outweighs any injury that 
could be caused to the marital relationship by disclosure of such 
communications, particularly in light of the fact that most married 
couples do not even know that the privilege exists.155 
                                                     
 150. Cf. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (“When one spouse is willing to 
testify against the other in a criminal proceeding—whatever the motivation—their relationship is 
almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege 
to preserve.”).  This is certainly even more the case when a spouse is accused of child molestation. 
 151. United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “a serious crime 
against a child is an offense against that family harmony”). 
 152. United States v. Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d 835, 836 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (“A privilege deeply 
rooted in society’s interest in promoting marital harmony and stability must surely wither when the 
defendant-spouse is accused of abusing the children of that marriage.”). 
 153. See United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 342 n.6 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (noting that the 
confidential-marital-communications privilege was created to preserve the harmony of the marriage, 
but the marital harmony would be disturbed by abuse of any child, regardless of whether the child 
was one of either spouse). 
 154. United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 155. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 34, § 86, at 384; Story, supra note 59, at 280; Eileen A. 
Scallen, Relational and Informational Privileges and the Case of the Mysterious Meditation 
Privilege, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 537, 559 (2004). 
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3. Molestation of Any Child Negatively Impacts the Society at Large 
One court explained that “a serious crime against a child is an 
offense . . . to society.”156  This is particularly true in child-molestation 
cases.  Unlike other criminal offenders, child sex offenders often 
victimize multiple children and have strong, continuous urges to 
reoffend.157  Child sexual abuse is also unique in comparison to other 
crimes because of the effects the crime leaves on the victims.  For 
example, when compared to children who have not been sexually abused, 
sexually abused children are fifty-five percent more likely to be arrested 
later in life, five-hundred percent more likely to be arrested for sex 
crimes later in life, and three-thousand percent more likely to be arrested 
for adult prostitution.158  Thus, while all crime has a negative impact on 
society, because of the recidivist nature of the offender and because of 
the negative impact on each victim’s future, society at large is 
particularly harmed if child-molestation cases are not successfully 
prosecuted.  The harm to society is the same, regardless of whether the 
child is the biological child of the offender or unknown to the offender.  
Thus, the any-child exception to the confidential-marital-
communications privilege should be adopted to protect society from 
harm.159  “[A] contrary rule would make children a target population 
within the marital enclave.”160 
                                                     
 156. Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366; see also Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (“Children, especially 
those of tender years who cannot defend themselves or complain, are vulnerable to abuse. Society 
has a stronger interest in protecting such children than in preserving marital autonomy and 
privacy.”). 
 157. Saad, supra note 138, at 604; see also CHILD MOLESTATION STATISTICS, 
http://childsafetips.com.abouttips.com/child-molestation-statistics.php (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) 
(asserting that the average molester will molest fifty girls before being caught and convicted). 
 158. Saad, supra note 138, at 605 (citing Jonathon J. Hegre, Minnesota “Nice”? Minnesota 
Mean: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Refusal to Protect Sexually Abused Children in H.B. ex rel. 
Clarke v. Whittmore, 15 LAW AND INEQ. 435, 440–41 (1997)). 
 159. See Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (adopting the any-child exception to the confidential-
marital-communications privilege the court explained: “The Court has not searched the dark corners 
of the world, nor that era when mankind lived within the confines of a cave that might call for a 
contrary result.  The Court therefore concludes that in a case where one spouse is accused of abusing 
minor children, society’s interest in the administration of justice far outweighs its interest in 
protecting whatever harmony or trust may at that point still remain in the marital relationship.”). 
 160. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5593, at 761. 
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4. Many State Legislatures Have Adopted the Any-Child Exception to 
the Confidential-Marital-Communications Privilege 
The importance of the public interest at issue is evidenced by the fact 
that currently twenty-five state legislatures have adopted the broad any-
child exception.161  This current trend shows that the communications 
between spouses concerning child molestation are not protected because 
“they are antithetical to society’s concept of the marital relationship.”162  
Thus, as a matter of policy, many state legislatures and courts see no 
difference in the sexual abuse of a child who is the son or daughter of the 
abuser as opposed to any other child who is sexually abused.163  Indeed, a 
narrower application of the exception for children under the marital-
communications privilege might be a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause because the exception would only protect a child of either spouse 
or a child in the home as opposed to other children without any rational 
basis.164 
                                                     
 161. See supra Part III.B; see also Appendix infra Part VI (any-child category). 
 162. United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 982 (9th Cir. 2009) (Alarcón, J., dissenting) ( “Since 
Trammel was decided in 1980, courts, federal and state, and state legislatures, have continued to 
limit the marital communications privilege in obedience to the Court’s direction that it ‘must be 
strictly construed and accepted only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or 
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of 
utilization of all rational means for ascertaining the truth.’” (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 
U.S. 40, 50 (1980))). 
 163. See, e.g., id. at 988 (“‘We see no logical reason for the Legislature to deny the spousal 
privilege when a young victim of abuse is a child of one or both spouses (or other child closely 
related by consanguinity) but to perpetuate the privilege when the young victim is related to neither 
spouse. The abuse is the same. Society’s interest in convicting and punishing one who commits child 
abuse is the same. The threat to the preservation of the family unit arising from one spouse being 
compelled to testify against the other seems substantially identical in all instances.’” (quoting 
Villalta v. Commonwealth, 702 N.E.2d 1148 (Mass. 1998))); United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 
1446 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We see no significant difference, as a policy matter, between a crime against 
a child of the married couple, against a stepchild living in the home or, as here, against an eleven-
year-old relative visiting the home.”). 
 164. See Kimberly Ann Connor, Note, A Critique of the Marital Privileges: An Examination of 
the Marital Privileges in the United States Military Through the State and Federal Approaches to 
Marital Privileges, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 167–68 (2001).  Potentially, the current version of the 
rule may violate the Equal Protection Clause.  MRE 504 might be unconstitutional if there is not a 
reasonable justification for allowing a spouse to testify to confidential communications concerning 
biological children while simultaneously refusing to allow the testimony of similar communications 
involving de facto children who are abused or even murdered.  Although the classification, “a child 
of either spouse” versus all other children residing in the home is only subject to rational basis 
review, if the distinction is arbitrary or capricious it will nonetheless violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
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B. How Federal Courts Can Adopt the Any-Child Exception 
Although no federal court of appeals has adopted the any-child 
exception to the confidential-marital-communications privilege, the legal 
rationale to do so is supported by both jurisprudence and public policy.  
To begin, the confidential-marital-communications privilege is not a 
constitutional right, but a privilege with common law roots.165  Because it 
is a privilege, it is not “intended to facilitate the fact-finding process or to 
safeguard its integrity.”166  Thus, the effect of the privilege “is clearly 
inhibitive; rather than facilitating the illumination of truth, [it] shut[s] out 
the light.”167  Because the confidential-marital-communications privilege 
impedes the truth-seeking process by withholding relevant testimony, it 
must be “strictly construed.”168 
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that federal 
courts are to interpret the application of the confidential-marital-
communications privilege “by principles of the common law . . . in the 
light of reason and experience.”169  In “enacting Rule 501, Congress 
manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege,”170 
but rather to “provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of 
privilege on a case-by-case basis.”171  Federal courts have interpreted this 
                                                     
 165. Id.; see supra Part III.A. 
 166. 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 34, § 72, at 339. 
 167. Id. 
 168. United States v. Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 50–51 (1980); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every [person’s] 
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search 
for truth.”); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Any rule 
that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing of justice.”); State v. 
Montgomery, 759 A.2d 995, 1014 (Conn. 2000) (“‘[The privilege] is to be applied cautiously and 
with circumspection because it impedes the truth-seeking function of the adjudicative process.’” 
(quoting Babcock v. Bridgeport Hosp., 742 A.2d 322 (Conn. 1988))); Dan Markel et al., Criminal 
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1201–02 (noting that “every 
man’s evidence should be available in the administration of justice”). 
 169. FED. R. EVID. 501.  Rule 501 adopted the language the United States Supreme Court used in 
Wolfle.  See United States v. Wolfle, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 
8 (1996) (“The authors of the Rule [501] borrowed this phrase from our opinion in [Wolfle], which 
in turn referred to the oft-repeated observation that ‘the common law is not immutable but flexible, 
and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.’” (quoting Funk v. United States, 290 
U.S. 371, 383 (1933))). 
 170. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47. 
 171. Id. (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)); see also United 
States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the courts have the right to 
review “policies behind the federal common law privileges and to alter or amend them when ‘reason 
and experience’ so demand” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501)).  Although the dissent in Allery disagreed 
with the holding, it also noted that the federal courts have the right to review and alter evidentiary 
privileges.  See Allery, 526 F.2d at 1367 (Henley, J., dissenting). 
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language to mean that the extent of evidentiary privileges must undergo a 
balancing test.172  Thus, to determine the extent of exceptions to the 
confidential-marital-communications privilege, the interest of protecting 
marital harmony must be balanced with the interest of truth-seeking in 
child-molestation cases.173 
In United States v. Allery, the Eighth Circuit applied the balancing 
test to an analogous situation.174  The issue in Allery was whether there 
should be an exception to the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege, which 
would allow a wife to testify against a husband in the case of the sexual 
abuse of the husband’s step-child.175  That issue is narrower than the 
issue addressed in this Article, which is whether there should be an any-
child exception to confidential-marital-communications privilege in 
child-molestation cases.  Nevertheless, Allery is still instructive for 
several reasons.  Allery illustrates how to approach the legal analysis of 
applying a new exception to one of the marital privileges under Rule 501 
in child-molestation cases.176  Allery is particularly helpful since the 
adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and the confidential-marital-
communications privilege have similar history and are derived from the 
same common law roots.177  Moreover, the underlying policy of each 
privilege is to protect the marital unit.178  Thus, Allery sets forth an 
appropriate analysis for determining whether exceptions to the 
confidential-marital-communications privilege should be expanded. 
The Allery court found that exceptions to the adverse-spousal-
testimony privilege should include crimes against the child of either 
spouse for the following five reasons: (1) a serious crime against a child 
is an offense to society and family harmony, which the privilege 
                                                     
 172. United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit 
had adopted “the balancing test set forth by the Eighth Circuit in” Allery (citing Allery, 526 F.2d at 
1366–67)). 
 173. Id. (noting that the confidential-marital-communications privilege is a “balancing [of] the 
public’s interest in the full and fair administration of justice and the need to protect the integrity of 
marriage and ensure that spouses freely communicate”). 
 174. Allery, 526 F.2d at 1362. 
 175. Id. at 1363–64.  The ruling in Allery occurred before the Supreme Court held in Trammel 
that the “witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely.”  Trammel, 445 U.S. at 
53. 
 176. See, e.g., Banks, 556 F.3d at 974 (“In determining whether the functional equivalent of a 
child/parent relationship should support an exception to the marital communications privilege, the 
rationale of Allery is instructive.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46, n.7; see also supra Part II.A–B. 
 178. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that both the 
adverse-spousal-testimony privilege and the confidential-marital-communications privilege are 
meant to protect the marriage); see also supra Part II.A. 
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purportedly protects, (2) parental testimony is necessary in prosecutions 
for child abuse, (3) limiting “truth” leads to the miscarriage of justice, (4) 
state common law supports an adverse-spousal-testimony privilege 
exception for crimes against children of either spouse, and (5) “at least 
eleven states have passed laws rendering the marital privilege 
unapplicable in cases of charged child abuse and neglect.”179 
These factors set forth by Allery can be applied to the issue here—
whether the exception to the confidential-marital-communications 
privilege exception should be expanded to protect any child in child-
molestation cases.  As addressed in Part IV.A of this Article, the abuse of 
any child would have a negative impact on family harmony and 
society.180  Moreover, communications between spouses comprise 
critical testimony, given the difficulty in successfully prosecuting child-
molestation cases.181  Finally, twenty-five state legislatures—more than 
double the “eleven states” mentioned in Allery—have recognized that the 
need to protect children outweighs the value of protecting the marriage 
relationship and, thus, have expanded the exception to the confidential-
marital-communications privilege to include the any-child standard.182  
This last point alone is enough to tip the balancing scales in favor of 
adopting the any-child exception since federal courts are to consider 
consensus among state laws when applying Rule 501.183 
Given that courts should construe privileges narrowly and given that 
the interest in protecting the general welfare of children and the 
administration of justice far outweighs any possible interest protected by 
the confidential-marital-communications privilege in child-molestation 
cases, “principles of common law . . . in light of reason and 
                                                     
 179. Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366–67. 
 180. See supra Part IV.A.2–3. 
 181. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 182. See supra Parts III.B, IV.A.4; see also Appendix infra Part VI. 
 183. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996) (“[I]t is appropriate to treat a consistent body 
of policy determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both ‘reason’ and ‘experience.’” (citing 
Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933))).  In Jaffee, the Supreme Court created the new 
psychotherapist-patient-communications privilege.  Id. at 12.  The Court reasoned: 
[I]t is appropriate for the federal courts to recognize a psychotherapist privilege under 
Rule 501 . . . by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted into 
law some form of psychotherapist privilege.  We have previously observed that the policy 
decisions of the States bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a 
new privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one . . . . Because state legislatures 
are fully aware of the need to protect the integrity of the factfinding functions of their 
courts, the existence of a consensus among the States indicates that “reason and 
experience” support recognition of the privilege. 
Id. at 12–13 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48–50 (1980); United States v. Gillock, 
445 U.S. 360, 368 n.8 (1980)). 
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experience”184 dictate that the any-child exception should be adopted by 
all federal courts.185 
C. How State Legislatures Can Adopt the Any-Child Exception 
Half of the state legislatures and the District of Columbia have yet to 
adopt the broadest any-child exception to the confidential-marital-
communications privilege.186  These jurisdictions should adopt the any-
child exception for the public-policy reasons set forth above, including: 
child-molestation cases are difficult to prove, and, thus, communications 
about the crime between spouses may prove critical; and child 
molestation of any child, regardless of the connection to the family 
home, is an offense to marital harmony and to society.187  It is the 
responsibility of the legislatures to balance competing considerations in 
law.188 
A proposed law would track language similar to those states which 
have adopted the any-child exception.189  The law could provide that a 
person has no confidential-marital-communications privilege where one 
spouse is charged with the molestation of any child.  Because problems 
of prosecuting child-molestation cases decreases as the age of the child 
increases (older children are likely more capable of testifying about 
sexual abuse than younger children),190 state laws should also make clear 
that any child would include individuals under the age of sixteen or an 
individual with the mental ability of a sixteen-year-old.191 
                                                     
 184. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 185. While the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are split as to what the exception to the confidential-
marital-communications privilege should be, neither has sufficiently extended this exception to the 
any-child standard.  Compare United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (adopting 
the child-of-either-spouse exception), with United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 
1997) (adopting the child-living-in-the-home exception); see also supra Part III.A, C. 
 186. See supra Part III.B; see also Appendix infra Part VI (child-of-either-spouse and child-
living-in-the-home categories). 
 187. See supra Part IV.A.1–4. 
 188. See Scallen, supra 155, at 541 (stating that “virtually all privileges . . . are subject to 
multiple exceptions, meaning that even though a holder of a privilege may want to refuse to provide 
certain evidence, as a matter of policy lawmakers could not allow the evidence to be withheld from 
the trier of fact”). 
 189. See supra Part III.B; see also Appendix infra Part VI (any-child category). 
 190. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 191. The age limit could be either sixteen or eighteen years of age depending on the state’s 
statutory rape law.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a) (2010) (“A person commits the crime of 
rape in the second degree if: (1) Being 16 years old or older, he or she engages in sexual intercourse 
with a member of the opposite sex less than 16 . . . . (2) He or she engages in sexual intercourse with 
a member of the opposite sex who is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective.”); 
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It is important for state legislatures to adopt these laws because it 
impacts the way child-molestation cases are prosecuted in both state and 
federal courts.192  If all states would enact similar laws adopting the any-
child exception less confusion would result.  Parties would not be forced 
to litigate what constitutes de facto parental status193 or what constitutes a 
child “living in the home.”194  With the any-child exception it would be 
clear to a lay-person and law-person alike that, in child-molestation 
cases, child-predators cannot confess to their spouse and then hide 
behind an evidentiary privilege. 
D. Legal Theory Supports the Adoption of the Any-Child Exception 
Not only does public policy and jurisprudence support the adoption 
of the any-child exception to the confidential-marital-communications 
privilege, legal theory supports the same conclusion.  Generally, scholars 
have identified two legal theories concerning evidentiary privileges: (1) 
Wigmore’s “Instrumental Rationale” and (2) the “Humanistic 
Rationale.”195  Each theory will be taken in turn. 
1. Wigmore’s Instrumental Rationale 
Courts often cite to Wigmore’s Instrumental Rationale when 
considering the application of evidentiary privileges.196  Essentially, 
Wigmore’s Instrumental Rationale rests “on the factual assumption of a 
causal connection between the existence of a privilege and certain out-of-
court behavior.”197  Under this theory, evidentiary privileges, given that 
                                                                                                                       
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (2010) (“A person commits sexual conduct with a minor by 
intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person 
who is under eighteen years of age.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1996) (explaining that it is appropriate for 
federal courts to consider state laws in analyzing evidentiary privileges); United States v. McCollum, 
58 M.J. 323, 340 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (relying on the plain language of the statute and legislative intent, 
the court refused to expand the child-of-either-spouse exception to the confidential-marital-
communications privilege to include de facto children); In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 
1987) (“In recent years preventing sexual abuse of children in family settings has become a major 
social and judicial concern.”). 
 193. The de facto parental exception was the issue litigated in Banks.  See United States v. 
Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 2009); see also supra Part III.A. 
 194. The child-living-in-the-home exception was the issue litigated in Bahe.  See United States v. 
Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997); see also supra Part III.C. 
 195. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE—
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 3.1, at 150–53, § 5.1.2, at 293–95 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002). 
 196. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 406 (1998); Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9. 
 197. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 195, § 5.1.2 at 259. 
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they impede the truth-seeking function of the courts, should be 
recognized only if four conditions have been met: 
 (1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they 
will not be disclosed. 
 (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
 (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community 
ought to be sedulously fostered. 
 (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of 
the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for 
the correct disposal of litigation.198 
If a privilege fails to meet any of these four conditions, then it is not 
valid under the Instrumental Rationale.199  By extension, the failure of an 
existing privilege to meet any one of these conditions could provide a 
basis to abrogate that privilege.200  In other words, if the use of the 
confidential-marital-communications privilege in child-molestation cases 
compromises any one of these conditions, then the Instrumental 
Rationale could be used to support a necessary exception to the privilege. 
While most scholars agree that the confidential-marital-
communications privilege meets the first and third conditions of the 
Instrumental Rationale, critics have questioned whether the second and 
fourth conditions are met.201  For the second condition, the privilege of 
confidentiality may not be essential to spousal relations since, in practice, 
most spouses would continue to confide in each other even if the 
privilege were not present.202  The privilege may not meet the fourth 
condition for similar reasons.  If the marital relationship is not based on a 
presumption of confidentiality, then a breach of the confidentiality would 
not be sufficiently detrimental to outweigh the interests in divulging the 
                                                     
 198. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2285, at 527; Story, supra note 59, at 305. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Story, supra note 59, at 308. 
 201. Id. at 308 (“Indeed, Wigmore . . . questioned whether the instrumental model would support 
the case for a spousal privilege.”); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 195, § 3.2.3, at 136–37. 
 202. See Story, supra note 59, at 306.  This privilege may be contrasted to the attorney-client 
relationship, in which the privilege is critical to maintaining the affiliation.  See id.  Critics contend 
that the underlying policy of encouraging confidences between spouses is not fostered because 
spouses are unaware that the privilege even exists.  See id.; see also 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 34, 
§ 86, at 384 (explaining that “the probable benefits of the rule of privilege in encouraging marital 
confidences and wedded harmony are doubtful” because “in the lives of most people appearance in 
court as a party or witness is an exceedingly rare and unusual event, and the anticipation of it is not 
one of those factors which materially influence in daily life the degree of fullness of marital 
disclosures”); Scallen, supra note 155, at 559; Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1579. 
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information at trial.203  Therefore, it would be appropriate to abrogate the 
privilege, or provide exceptions to it, where the expectation of 
confidentiality is minimal and the benefit for litigation purposes is 
significant.  This is precisely the case with the use of the confidential-
marital-communications privilege in child-molestation prosecutions.  As 
stated earlier, for at least four reasons the interest in protecting children, 
regardless of their connection to the family unit, outweighs the benefit, if 
any, gained by allowing a person to invoke the privilege in child-
molestation cases.204 
2. The Humanistic Rationale 
The Humanistic Rationale states that evidentiary privileges should be 
designed to protect individual rights.205  Unlike Wigmore’s Instrumental 
Rationale, which generally focuses on the benefit to society by 
furtherance of relationships, the Humanistic Rationale focuses on the 
individual’s personal rights, such as the protection of privacy.206  The 
protection of privacy justification for the use of the confidential-marital-
communications privilege, however, fails in the context of child sexual 
abuse. 
First, while this theory is discussed among scholars, courts have not 
relied on it for the confidential-marital-communications privilege.207  
Moreover, if privacy is a justification for the marital-communications 
privilege, it is only in so far as the confidential-marital-communications 
privilege is a qualified privilege, affording exceptions in cases where 
                                                     
 203. See Story, supra note 59, at 308; see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2332, at 642 
(stating that under his four conditions for creation of an evidentiary privilege, an “argument against 
recognition of the [marital communications] privilege is based on the proposition that the fourth 
condition . . . is not in truth fulfilled” because “the occasional compulsory disclosure in court of even 
the most intimate marital communications would not in fact affect to any perceptible degree the 
extent to which spouses share confidences”). 
 204. See supra Part IV.A. 
 205. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 195, § 5.1.2, at 259. 
 206. See Raymond F. Miller, Comment, Creating Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument For The 
Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771, 784–85 (1999).  In American jurisprudence, the privacy 
concern is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where courts have 
recognized privacy rights in marriages, childbearing, and cohabitating.  See id. at 785; see also, e.g., 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding the United States Constitution protected an 
individual’s right to privacy in the use of contraceptives). 
 207. See Story, supra note 59, at 315 (“Because courts have exclusively relied upon the 
utilitarian approach to justify the evidentiary privileges, it is very unlikely that they would 
employ . . . the humanistic rationales.”); Steven Goode, Identity, Fees, and the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307, 316 n.63 (1991) (noting that “judicial reliance” on theories 
other than the Instrumental Rationale is “as rare as the proverbial hen’s tooth”). 
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evidence is not otherwise obtainable.208  Thus, in cases of child sexual 
abuse where it is well-established that evidence is difficult to obtain, 
regardless of whether the child is related to either spouse, an exception to 
the confidential-marital-communication privilege must exist.209 
V. CONCLUSION 
Child molestation is an unbearable crime.  Many children are 
sexually abused outside their own homes by predators that have no 
relationship to them.  A child in this situation should receive no less 
protection from sexual abuse than a “child of either spouse” or a child 
“living in the home.”  Yet, in all federal circuits, half of the states, the 
District of Columbia, and the military, this is exactly the scenario when 
defendants confess their crimes to their spouses and then invoke the 
confidential-marital-communications privilege.210  Public policy, 
jurisprudence, and legal theory support the adoption of a broad any-child 
exception to the use of the confidential-marital-communications 
privilege in child-molestation cases.211 
                                                     
 208. 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 34, § 86, at 385 (“The humanistic need for creation of a private 
enclave within a marital relationship may not stand in the balance where there is a need for 
otherwise unobtainable evidence critical to the ascertainment of significant legal rights.”). 
 209. See supra Part IV.A. 
 210. See supra Part III; see also Appendix infra Part VI. 
 211. Although beyond the scope of this Article, given the common history and common 
underlying policy of both marital privileges, see supra Part II, similar arguments could be made that 
a testifying spouse should not be allowed to invoke the adverse-spousal-testimony privilege in the 
prosecution of the sexual abuse of any child.  But see United States v. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221, 
1231–32 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that the testifying spouse can invoke the adverse-spousal-
testimony privilege in abuse of the defendant’s granddaughter). 
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VI. APPENDIX 
Table 2: Summary of Exceptions to the Confidential-Marital-














FEDERAL    
9th Circuit United States v. 
Banks, 556 F.3d 
967, 975 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
  
10th Circuit  United States v. 
Bahe, 128 F.3d 




8th, 11th, and 
D.C. Circuits 





 MILITARY R. EVID. 
504(d).216 
 
STATES    
Alabama  ALA. R. EVID. 
504(d)(3)(B). 
 
                                                     
 212. See explanation of child-of-either-spouse exception supra Part III.B.1. 
 213. See explanation of child-residing-in-the-home exception supra Part III.B.2. 
 214. See explanation of any-child exception supra Part III.B.3. 
 215. While there is no appellate case on point for the First through Eighth Circuits, Eleventh 
Circuit, or D.C. Circuit, a few federal district court cases in these circuits address the exception to 
the confidential-marital-communications privilege in child abuse cases.  See United States v. 
Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d 835, 837 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that “the marital communications 
privilege should not apply to statements relating to a crime where the victim is a minor child”); 
United States v. Mavroules, 813 F. Supp. 115, 120 (D. Mass. 1993) (recognizing that “[p]rotecting 
threats against . . . a spouse’s children is inconsistent with the marital communications privilege” 
(citing United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992))). 
 216. Rule 504 of the Military Rules of Evidence was enacted after United States v. McCollum, 
58 M.J. 323 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (holding that there is an exception to the marital-communications 
privilege when a “child of either” spouse is a victim).  Thus, Rule 504 broadened the exception to 
include children residing in the home that were not necessarily a child of either. 
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Jurisdiction Child-of-Either-
Spouse Exception 










Alaska ALASKA R. EVID. 
505(a)(2)(D)(ii).217 
  
Arizona   ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12-2232(2) 
(Supp. 2009).218 
Arkansas ARK. R. EVID. 
504(d).219 
  
California CAL. EVID. CODE  
§ 972(e)(1) (West 
2009).220 
  
Colorado   COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-90-107 
(West Supp. 2009); 
§ 14-13-310 (West 
2005);  
§ 18-6-401.1 (West 
2004).221 
Connecticut   CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 53-21,222 
54-84a (West 
2009).223 
                                                     
 217. See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 681 P.2d 341, 345 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (finding that the 
adverse-spousal-testimony privilege, the language of which is analogous to Alaska’s confidential-
marital-communications privilege, extended to a “foster child”). 
 218. State v. Salzman, 679 P.2d 544, 546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that, per section 13-
3620(D) of the Arizona Revised Statutes, the marital privilege does not extend to cases where “a 
child’s neglect, dependency, abuse or abandonment is an issue”). 
 219. Munson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ark. 1998) (holding that an exception to 
confidential marital privilege applied to child “residing” in the household). 
 220. People v. Siravo, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 352 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating that no marital privilege 
applies when there is a crime against a child or “cohabitant” of either spouse). 
 221. People v. Corbett, 656 P.2d 687, 689 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (explaining that the state 
statute indicates that child abuse cases are an exception to the marital-privilege doctrine). 
 222. But see Connecticut v. Scruggs, 905 A.2d 24 (Conn. 2006) (holding Connecticut’s risk to 
injury statute, section 53-21 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, unconstitutional on other 
grounds). 
 223. State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 1173 n.9 (Conn. 2004) (explaining no privilege for crime 
against child in custody or control). 
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Georgia   GA. CODE ANN.  
§§ 24-9-21(1),  
-23(b) (West 
2003).227 
Hawaii  HAW. R. EVID. 
505(c).228 
 
Idaho   IDAHO CODE ANN.  
§ 9-203(1) (West 
2006); IDAHO R. 
EVID. 504(d)(1). 229 
                                                     
 224. State v. Howard, 728 A.2d 1178, 1179 n.3 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (explaining that marital 
privilege does not apply to a wrong against a child of either spouse or against a person residing in 
either household). 
 225. See also D.C. CODE § 22-3024 (Supp. 2010) (“Laws attaching a privilege against disclosure 
of communications between spouses or domestic partners are inapplicable in prosecutions under 
subchapter II of this chapter where the defendant is or was married to the victim, or is or was a 
domestic partner of the victim, or where the victim is a child.”).  “Child” is defined in section 14-
306(b)(1)(B) of the District of Columbia Code as “(i) In the custody of or resides temporarily or 
permanently in the household of one of the spouses or domestic partners; or (ii) Related by blood, 
marriage, domestic partnership, or adoption to one of the spouses or domestic partners.”  Id. § 14-
306(b)(1)(B). 
 226. Hill v. State, 846 So. 2d 1208, 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding no marital privilege 
for crime against child of either spouse). 
 227. Nichols v. State, 653 S.E.2d 300, 305 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that marital privilege 
does not apply to crimes against a minor child). 
 228. See, e.g., State v. Okubo, 53 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that under 
Rule 505, no spousal privilege exists for a crime against child of either spouse, nor does the privilege 
exist for a person residing in the household of either). 
 229. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 965 P.2d 174, 182 (Idaho 1998) (holding that the husband-wife 
privilege does not apply to issues relating to condition or welfare of a child, including abuse). 
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Illinois 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/115-
16 (West 2008); 
735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/8-801 
(West 2003).230 
  
Indiana   IND. CODE ANN.  
§ 31-32-11-1 (West 




Iowa   IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 232.74, 622.9 
(West 1999 & 
Supp. 2010).232 




Kentucky  KY. R. EVID. 
504(c)(2)(c).234 
 
                                                     
 230. People v. Eveans, 660 N.E.2d 240, 247 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (holding marital privilege 
exception applies where either spouse has the care, custody, or control of any child). 
 231. Deasy-Leas v. Leas, 693 N.E.2d 90, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that child abuse and 
neglect are exceptions to privileged communications), abrogated on other grounds by Martin v. 
State, 774 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. 2002). 
 232. State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Iowa 2001) (holding an exception for marital 
communication privilege for “evidence of injuries to children . . . that resulted from or related to a 
report of suspected child abuse”). 
 233. State v. Myers, 640 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Kan. 1982) (recognizing no marital privilege in 
relation to a crime against a child of either spouse). 
 234. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Ky. 2002) (holding privilege does not apply 
when one spouse is charged with wrongful conduct against an individual residing in the household 
of either spouse). 
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Louisiana   LA. CODE EVID. 
ANN. art. 504(c)(1), 
(4) (2006); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN.  
§ 14:403(B) 
(2004).235 
Maine  ME. R. EVID. 
504(d). 
 
Maryland   MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§§ 9-105,  
9-106(a)(1) (West 
2002).236 
Massachusetts   MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 233, § 20 
(West 2000).237 
Michigan   MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 600.2162 
(West Supp. 
2010).238 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 595.02(a) (West 
2010).239 
  
                                                     
 235. Section 14:403(B) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes provides: “In any proceeding 
concerning the abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child or the cause of such condition, evidence 
may not be excluded on any ground of privilege, except in the case of communications between an 
attorney and his client or between a priest, rabbi, duly ordained minister or Christian Science 
practitioner and his communicant.”   
 236. See, e.g., Mulligan v. State, 252 A.2d 476, 485 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (holding that 
spouse is a compellable witness when the criminal proceedings involve the abuse of a child). 
 237. Villalta v. Commonwealth, 702 N.E.2d 1148, 1152 (Mass. 1998) (holding the marital 
privilege inapplicable when criminal conduct involves abuse of any child). 
 238. People v. Simpson, 347 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding “the exception for 
crimes committed against the children of one or both spouses is not restricted to minor children, but 
rather extends to all children regardless of age”), vacated on other grounds by People v. Petrella, 380 
N.W.2d 11 (1986). 
 239. State v. Willette, 421 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding no marital privilege 
applies in cases of “sexual abuse of a child by a person responsible for, or in a position of authority 
over, that child”). 
1GOODNO FINAL 11/5/2010  7:53:41 AM 
42 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
Jurisdiction Child-of-Either-
Spouse Exception 










Mississippi   MISS. R. EVID. 
504(d).240 




Montana   MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 26-1-802,  
41-3-437(5) 
(2009).242 














                                                     
 240. Stevens v. State, 867 So. 2d 219, 224 (Miss. 2003) (marital privilege rule “contains an 
exception to the privilege where one spouse is charged with a crime against a minor child”). 
 241. Section 210.140 of the Missouri Statutes provides in relevant part: “Any legally recognized 
privileged communication, except that between attorney and client or involving communications 
made to a minister or clergyperson, shall not apply to situations involving known or suspected child 
abuse or neglect . . . .”  
 242. In re J. H., 640 P.2d 445, 447 (Mont. 1982) (holding privilege does not apply because “once 
a family member has been sexually abused, the sanctity of the home and the reason for the rule have 
been destroyed”). 
 243. State v. Vicars, 299 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Neb. 1980) (holding no privilege in statutory rape 
case). 
 244. Meador v. State, 711 P.2d 852, 854 (Nev. 1985) (reasoning the privilege is inapplicable 
“where the spouse invoking the privilege has been charged with a crime against a child in the 
custody or control of either spouse”). 
 245. State v. Pelletier, 818 A.2d 292, 298 (N.H. 2003) (recognizing a public policy limitation to 
N.H. Evid. Rule 504 for cases involving a “child of either” as a victim of the crime). 
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New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:84A-17(2)(b) 
(West Supp. 2010); 
§ 2A:84A-22 (West 
1994). 
  
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38-6-6 (West 
2010); N.M. R. 
EVID. 11-505(1).246 
  






  N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 8-57.1(c), 
8-57.1 (West 2000). 
North Dakota  N.D. R. EVID. 
504(d). 
 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2317.02(D) 
(West Supp. 2009); 
§ 2945.42 (West 
2006).248 
  
                                                     
 246. State v. Howell, 596 P.2d 277, 278 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the exception to the 
privilege only applies when the victim is a child of either spouse and finding that a daycare worker 
cannot establish loco parentis status qualifying for the exception). 
 247. People v. Allman, 342 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (App. Div. 1973) (recognizing public policy 
limitation for cases where “any child” is a victim of the crime). 
 248. See also OHIO R. EVID. 501 (“The privilege of a witness, person, state or political 
subdivision thereof shall be governed by statute enacted by the General Assembly or by principles of 
common law as interpreted by the courts of this state in the light of reason and experience.”); State v. 
Wilson, No. 12-05-20, 2006 WL 1062103, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2006) (holding that the 
marital privilege did not apply when charge was rape of couple’s daughter).  But cf. Akron v. 
Hockman, 759 N.E.2d 1286, 1288 n.3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that the spousal-testimony 
privilege portion of section 2945.42 of the Ohio Revised Code has been preempted by Rule 601 of 
the Ohio Rules of Evidence).  Rule 601(B) provides in relevant part: “Every person is competent to 
be a witness except . . . (B) A spouse testifying against the other spouse charged with a crime except 
when [ ] the following applies: (1) a crime against the testifying spouse or a child of either spouse is 
charged . . . .”  OHIO R. EVID. 601(B). 
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Oklahoma  OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12,  
§ 2504(D)(3) (West 
2010). 
 
Oregon   OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40.255(4)(a) 
(West 2003).249 
Pennsylvania   42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 5913(2), 
(4), 5923 (West 
2000).250 
Rhode Island   R.I. GEN. LAWS 





  S.C. CODE ANN.  
§ 19-11-30 (1985) 
South Dakota  S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 19-13-13, 
-15(3) (2004). 
 




                                                     
 249. State v. Suttles, 597 P.2d 786, 789 (Or. 1979) (holding that legislative history abrogates 
both testimonial and communications privileges, as codified by statute, in cases involving abuse of a 
child, including sexual molestation). 
 250. Title 42, section 5913 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes apply an exception to the 
marital communications privilege for sex crimes and rape when any child is the victim of the crime, 
but applying only to children in the “care or custody” of either spouse when the child is a victim of 
all other crimes.   
 251. Section 12-17-10 of the General Laws of Rhode Island abolishes the marital-
communications privilege and, therefore, any time a child is subject of criminal abuse, there is no 
privilege for marital communications.  See State v. Angell, 405 A.2d 10, 16 (R.I. 1979) (holding that 
section “12-17-10 has altered the common-law privilege of confidential communications between a 
husband and wife”). 
 252. Adams v. State, 563 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that “the marital 
privilege does not apply so as to prevent the admission of testimony by a defendant’s spouse 
concerning acts of violence or personal injury inflicted by the defendant upon the children of either 
spouse or upon minor children in the custody of or under the dominion and control of either 
spouse”). 
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Texas   TEX. EVID. RULE 
504(a)(4)(C).253 
Utah  UTAH R. EVID. 
502(b)(4)(C)(iii).254 
 
Vermont  VT. R. EVID. 
504(d). 
 
Virginia   VA. CODE ANN.  
§§ 8.01-398,  
19.2-271.2(iii) 
(West Supp. 2010). 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 5.60.060(1) 
(West 2009).255 
  
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 57-3-3, 57-3-4 
(West 2002).256 
  









                                                     
 253. Rodriguez v. State, No. 14-07-00307-CR, 2008 WL 442577, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 
19, 2008) (holding that the marital privilege was abrogated when crime was against a minor). 
 254. State v. Widdison, 4 P.3d 100, 111–12 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (holding that marital privilege 
did not apply when crime was against child living in household of husband). 
 255. State v. Wood, 758 P.2d 530, 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (holding no marital privilege 
where defendant was “guardian” of child for purposes of the statute). 
 256. State v. Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903, 906 (W. Va. 1992) (holding that the marital privilege did 
not apply when charge was sexual assault of couple’s child). 
 257. State v. Michels, 414 N.W.2d 311, 316 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that exception to 
marital privilege extends to foster children because the exception “is to ensure that those individuals, 
particularly minor children, who are present in the home and are actively a part of the family 
structure are protected, via criminal prosecution, for crimes committed against them”). 
